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The Tax Court recently held that shares conveyed
in the merger of two family-owned businesses
constituted a taxable deemed gift.1 However, the
taxpayers fended off penalties by establishing that
they relied in good faith on the advice of their tax
advisers.
The taxpayers, William and Patricia Cavallaro,
formed Knight Tool Co. in 1976, with the husband
owning 49 percent and the wife 51 percent of the
company’s stock. Mrs. Cavallaro ran the front of the
shop (office) and Mr. Cavallaro the back (production). At the time of incorporation, the Cavallaros
had three teenage sons: Ken, Paul, and James. The
boys worked part time in the family business during school and eventually full time.
Knight was a contract manufacturer that produced custom tools and parts for other companies.
Five years into operation, Knight sought to expand
by creating, producing, and selling its own product.
Mr. Cavallaro and Ken decided to produce an
automated liquid adhesive dispensing machine for
use in producing computer circuit boards. Knight
created a prototype that it began selling under the
name CAM/ALOT (‘‘computer-assisted machine to
be sold and used a lot’’). Knight invested consider-

1

Cavallaro v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014-189.

able time and expense in developing CAM/ALOT.
Despite this, early versions of the machine were
subpar and failed to generate significant sales. Mr.
and Mrs. Cavallaro finally gave up on CAM/ALOT
and reverted to their original tool-making business.
Ken and his brothers, however, believed that
they could successfully develop and market CAM/
ALOT. To pursue this, the three sons formed a new
company called Camelot Systems Inc., with each
owning a one-third share.2 At the meeting in 1987
incorporating Camelot, the lawyer handed the corporate minute book to Mr. Cavallaro, who was in
attendance but was neither an incorporator nor
shareholder of the new entity. To make it clear that
Camelot was not his company, Mr. Cavallaro immediately gave the book to Ken, saying, ‘‘Take it; it’s
yours.’’
Ken then began working on improving CAM/
ALOT. He visited customers and trade shows to get
feedback on early versions of the computerized
dispensing machine. Ken relayed this information
to Knight engineers and worked with them to
develop a better product. According to the court,
‘‘his efforts were timely, as they coincided with a
relative boom in the liquid-dispensing industry.’’
Eventually, CAM/ALOT represented 90 percent of
Knight’s business.
Cavallaros’ Estate Planning
In the early 1990s, Mr. and Mrs. Cavallaro engaged Ernst & Young to review their estate plan.
The significant value of Knight, owned entirely by
the senior Cavallaro generation, posed the most
challenging estate tax issue. In the accountants’
opinion, Knight and Camelot should be merged,
and the combined entity transferred to the sons in a
transfer-tax-advantaged manner and then eventually sold to a third party.3
The Cavallaros also engaged an attorney from a
prominent Boston law firm to assist in estate planning.4 He also identified the potential transfer tax
liability flowing from a transfer of Knight to the
Cavallaro children as problematic. In contrast to the

2
Each brother contributed an equal share for a total initial
capital contribution of $1,000.
3
After the 1995 merger, Camelot was sold to a third party for
$57 million in cash plus up to $43 million in deferred payments
based on future profits.
4
The lawyer was a longtime acquaintance of Mrs. Cavallaro.
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Merger
In 1995, for reasons unrelated to estate planning,
Knight and Camelot began formulating a plan for
merging the two companies.6 An E&Y accountant
assessed the proposed combined entity at $70 million to $75 million, with Knight accounting for only
$13 million to $15 million (or about 19 percent) of
that figure.7 In completing his report, the appraiser
assumed that Camelot owned the CAM/ALOT
technology. On December 31, 1995, the two companies merged with Camelot as the surviving corporation.8 Based on the appraisal of the relative values
of each company to the merger, Mr. and Mrs.
Cavallaro (as former Knight shareholders) received
19 percent of the stock of the combined entity, and
the Cavallaros’ sons received the remaining 81
percent (divided equally among them).
Indirect Gift
In January 1998 the IRS audited Knight’s and
Camelot’s 1994 and 1995 income tax returns. In the
course of that examination, the IRS recognized that
the 1995 merger may have involved an indirect gift.
It thus opened a gift tax examination. In 2005 the

Cavallaros filed a gift tax return for 1995 reporting
no taxable gifts and no gift tax liability as a result of
the merger. In 2010 the IRS issued a notice of
deficiency for 1995 determining that the KnightCamelot combination resulted in a $46 million
taxable gift from the Cavallaros to their sons.
Whether a gift occurred as a result of the merger
depended on whether each party to the transaction
received an ownership interest in the combined
entity commensurate with the consideration that
they provided.9 That issue in turn depended on the
relative values of Knight and Camelot on the eve of
the merger. At trial, the Cavallaros offered two
valuation reports: one prepared contemporaneously with the merger and another prepared by a
different expert in preparation for trial. Both of
those appraisals assumed that Camelot owned the
CAM/ALOT technology and, as a result, allocated
only about 19 percent of the value of the combined
entity to Knight. The IRS’s expert, however, assumed that Knight owned CAM/ALOT and he
thus attributed 65 percent of the value of the
merged entity to Knight.
The crucial question for valuation purposes was
which company owned CAM/ALOT before the
merger. The Cavallaros argued that Camelot owned
the technology as of the 1987 symbolic transfer from
Knight. Judge David Gustafson sided with the IRS
and held that Knight originally owned CAM/
ALOT and never transferred it to Camelot. The
court viewed the relationship between the two
companies as follows: Knight, as owner of the
technology, manufactured the CAM/ALOT machines, and Camelot, as a mere sales agent, distributed them to customers. The companies’ financial
statements and tax returns reflected this relationship.10 Also, the CAM/ALOT trademark was registered in Knight’s name until the merger of the two
companies in 1995. The court gave no weight to the
documents prepared by the estate planning attorney in 1995 to memorialize the purported 1987
transfer.
Gustafson also found that the companies’ course
of conduct reflected Knight’s ownership of the
technology. Knight entered into key contracts for

5

The lawyer testified that this reminded him of ‘‘the ancient
way of transferring land.’’ Presumably, CAM/ALOT had negligible value in 1987.
6
For CAM/ALOT to be distributed in Europe, both Camelot
and Knight needed to be certified under European Union law.
To avoid having both companies separately undergo this long
and expensive certification, they decided to merge.
7
The accountant used a market-based approach, identifying
comparables for Knight and the combined entity. He did not
separately value Camelot, because he could not find suitable
comparables for the pre-merger company.
8
This was a tax-free merger for income tax purposes.
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9
Reg. section 25.2512-8 (taxable transfers include ‘‘sales,
exchanges, and other dispositions of property for a consideration to the extent that the value of the property transferred by
the donor exceeds the value in money or money’s worth of the
consideration given therefor’’).
10
On amended tax returns for 1990 to 1993, Knight claimed
research credits under section 41 for investments in the CAM/
ALOT technology. After adopting the attorney’s view that
Camelot owned the technology, the accountants filed another
set of amended returns for both companies that disclaimed the
research credits for Knight and claimed them for Camelot.
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accountants, the lawyer viewed the two-company
structure as advantageous. He took the position
that CAM/ALOT (and its associated value) was
owned by Camelot because Knight symbolically
transferred the CAM/ALOT technology to Camelot
in 1987 when Mr. Cavallaro handed over the Camelot minute book to Ken.5 To belatedly document
this transaction, the attorney suggested that Mr.
Cavallaro and Ken sign affidavits and a confirmatory bill of sale attesting to the 1987 transfer.
The accountants initially resisted the estate planner’s view that Camelot owned the technology,
citing the lack of alignment of that position with the
existing documentation in the public domain (financial statements, tax returns, etc.). The Cavallaros
were unaware of the disagreement among their
advisers regarding ownership of CAM/ALOT.
Eventually, the lawyer prevailed, and in 1995 the
Cavallaros signed the documents memorializing
the symbolic 1987 transfer of CAM/ALOT to Camelot.
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Given the court’s holding that the CAM/ALOT
technology resided in Knight, it disregarded both of
the Cavallaros experts’ valuations, which presumed
ownership in Camelot. According to the court, this
left ‘‘petitioners with no evidence on this critical
issue as to which they have the burden of proof.’’ As
a result, the court accepted the IRS expert’s valuation of $64.5 million for the merged entity, with 65
percent of this value attributable to Knight and 35
percent assigned to Camelot. Accordingly, the value
of the indirect gift from the Cavallaros to their sons
was $29.6 million (the difference between the 81
percent of the merged entity that the sons actually
received and the 35 percent that they should have
received given the value of Camelot before the
merger).12
Bad Bargain or Gift?
The Cavallaros tried to characterize the result of
the merger as an improvident bargain made in the
ordinary course of business. Reg. section 25.2512-8
provides that ‘‘a sale, exchange, or other transfer of
property made in the ordinary course of business (a
transaction which is bona fide, at arm’s length, and
free from any donative intent), will be considered as
made for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money’s worth,’’ and thus not a gift. The
court held that the 1995 merger was not at arm’s
length. An unrelated hypothetical buyer would
demand contemporaneous documentation of transfer of ownership of CAM/ALOT technology and
would not be satisfied with mere self-serving, afterthe-fact assertions of ownership. Instead, the court
viewed this as a related-party transaction, deserving of and unable to withstand heightened scrutiny.

11
The two companies shared accounting, payroll, and banking systems.
12
The gift amount of $29.6 million is equal to the difference
between $52.2 million (or 81 percent of $64.5 million) and $22.6
million (or 35 percent of $64.5 million).
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Penalties
At trial, the IRS asserted an addition to tax for
failure to file a timely gift tax return, and alternative
accuracy-related penalties.13 Although these penalties applied,14 the court held that the Cavallaros
successfully established a reasonable cause defense
to avoid liability.15 Mr. and Mrs. Cavallaro provided
accurate and necessary information to their advisers. It was the lawyer, said Gustafson, who was the
author of the ‘‘fiction of a 1987 transfer,’’ whereas
Mr. Cavallaro never gave the issue of assignment of
CAM/ALOT technology any thought.16 Given that
the Cavallaros lacked any advanced formal education17 or familiarity with sophisticated tax planning,
the court found that they were justified in relying
on the advice of experts from well-known law and
accounting firms.
Failure of Team Advising
Although the Cavallaros won on the penalty
issue, they lost on the underlying gift tax liability.18
Gustafson seemed to place the blame for this result
squarely on the group of professionals servicing the
Cavallaros.19 Generally, an advisory team approach
to estate planning can yield many benefits to the
client and to the professionals involved.20 However,
these gains can be realized only if the professionals
work together collaboratively to develop and
implement an effective plan. The Cavallaros’ team
failed as a result of an overzealous lawyer pushing
an unrealistic plan on a group of accountants whose
sins ranged from unjustified deference to willful
misconduct.

13

Sections 6651(a)(1) and 6662.
Because the Cavallaros did not file Form 709 until nine
years after the 1995 gifts, the section 6651(a)(1) penalty applied.
Because the Cavallaros reported zero gifts for 1995 on their gift
tax returns but the court determined that they made gifts
totaling $29.6 million in that year, the gross valuation misstatement penalty applied. See section 6662(h).
15
See section 6651(a)(1) (avoidance of penalty if taxpayer can
show that failure to file was ‘‘due to reasonable cause and not
due to willful neglect’’) and section 6664(c)(1) (avoidance of
penalty if taxpayer can show ‘‘that there was reasonable cause’’
for the underpayment and he ‘‘acted in good faith’’).
16
This position was reiterated by Mrs. Cavallaro at trial.
17
Mr. Cavallaro left high school to attend trade school, and
Mrs. Cavallaro graduated high school but left secretarial school
after one year.
18
A liability that will include accrued interest from 1995. See
section 6601.
19
After placing blame on the Cavallaros’ advisers for concocting the fictitious 1987 transfer, Gustafson said, ‘‘Since those
professionals are not parties here and have not had a full
opportunity explain or defend themselves, we refrain from
further comment on them.’’
20
See Daniel G. Worthington, ‘‘TEAM SPORT: A Multidisciplinary Approach to Advanced Estate Planning,’’ WealthManagement (July 30, 2001).
14
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CAM/ALOT and remained financially at risk for
order nonpayment. Further, the economic burden of
additional financing fell on Knight and/or Mr. and
Mrs. Cavallaro individually. Although Knight bore
the bulk of the economic risk associated with
CAM/ALOT, a disproportionate share of the economic rewards from the venture was allocated to
Camelot.11 According to the court, this allocation of
profits resulted ‘‘not [from] the objective values of
the companies but either to the deliberate benevolence of Mr. and Mrs. Cavallaro toward their sons or
else to a non-arm’s length carelessness born of the
family relationships of the parties.’’
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The estate planning attorney took an overly
aggressive position on the crucial issue of ownership of CAM/ALOT that did not reflect reality. A
good plan applied to bad facts is unlikely to succeed. In both the public and private spheres, the
Cavallaros consistently ignored the separate legal
existence of Knight and Camelot. Given this, the
lawyer failed in his attempt to repackage the disregarded two-company structure into an advantageous tax strategy. However, the same strategy used
at an earlier stage with contemporaneous documentation and buy-in from the clients may have generated enough good facts to support the narrative.
The accountants recognized that the lawyer’s
interpretation of the import of the 1987 meeting was
‘‘at odds with all the evidence.’’ In defending his
construction, the attorney replied: ‘‘History does
not formulate itself, the historian has to give it form
without being discouraged by having to squeeze a
few embarrassing facts into the suitcase by force.’’
Unfortunately, ignoring unhelpful facts will not
make them go away. After a ‘‘correspondence campaign,’’ the lawyer prevailed, and the accountants
acquiesced.21
Knight’s outside accountant engaged in willful
misrepresentation. In response to a request from the
IRS for the companies’ 1991 combined financial
statements, the Knight accountant altered the documents to reflect the Cavallaros’ litigating position
that Camelot owned the technology, while Knight
was a mere contractor.22 When questioned on the
issue, he lied to the court, disclaiming knowledge of
or responsibility for the after-the-fact modifications.
Given this, Gustafson properly discredited his testimony.
Conclusion
This case serves as a reminder that a shift in
value resulting from related-party corporate restructuring may generate a gift. By adopting an
unrealistic position, the Cavallaros and their professional team failed to appreciate that heightened
scrutiny is applied to non-arm’s-length transactions. Although improper advising allowed the
taxpayers to avoid penalties, they remain liable for
a substantial gift tax liability.

21
All this correspondence became available after the IRS
issued third-party summonses to E&Y seeking documents generated during communications with the attorney concerning the
Cavallaros’ estate planning. The Cavallaros filed petitions in
district court to quash these summonses. The district court
denied the petitions, and the First Circuit affirmed that decision.
Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002).
22
The unaltered narrative in the financial statements provided that Knight was ‘‘the sole provider of machines sold by
Camelot’’ and that Camelot’s principal business activity was
‘‘the selling of computerized liquid dispensing machines.’’
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